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WHY IS LAW A NORMATIVE DISCIPLINE? ON HANS
KELSEN’S ‘NORMOLOGY’
ABSTRACT. What does it mean to claim of law that it is a normative discipline?
Can the answer be so simple that one need merely refer to law’s normative object of
study and the conclusions that the legal participant must allegedly draw from this?
What, in any case, is a ‘normative discipline’? The essay attempts to address these
questions by analysing Hans Kelsen’s ‘normological’ theory of law through his work
on sovereignty and especially by focusing on the normative character of Kelsen’s
epistemological claims regarding law. A theoretical critique of Kelsen is oﬀered
through Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological account of logic as a normative dis-
cipline.
KEY WORDS: epistemology, law, logic, norms, phenomenology, pure theory of law
A PARTICIPANT’S PERSPECTIVE
In the interdisciplinary settings of contemporary research-intensive
university environments, legal scholars are often required to expli-
cate the claim that law, unlike the other disciplines that examine
human society, is by nature normative. A standard reply will take
the following form. Law is a normative discipline simply because it
studies legal norms, and, the argument continues, this gives the dis-
cipline a speciﬁc character that might best be described in terms of
a participant’s perspective. Like someone playing a game with
established rules, the lawyer ruling from the bench, along with her
academic colleague, are said to be involved in law as participants 
observing it from the inside as a collection of norms that must, at
least in principle, be acknowledged as legitimate. Otherwise, so the
argument concludes, the work of the lawyer would become sense-
less, as would a game with a player insisting on playing but without
recognising the rules of the game. As legal academics, this is the
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disciplinary creed that we are by default expected to follow and the
ethos that we are supposed to relay to our students.
There is a certain conformism, even conservatism, built into the
participant’s perspective and this, no doubt, is one of the reasons
why the emergence of a ‘law and society’ type of approach has
proved so productive. While the very ‘internality’ of the partici-
pant’s perspective seems to restrict the critique of law to an inter-
nal or immanent logic, a ‘law and society’ approach makes possible
an external criticism of law, through which we might question the
justiﬁability of even its most fundamental principles. The player,
caught up in the logic of the game, can make improvements and
adjustments as to how the game is played  but she cannot ques-
tion the overall legitimacy of the game itself without being
redeﬁned as an ‘outsider’. But for the socio-legal scholar, law is not
merely deﬁcient or imperfect, with its critical scope conﬁned to call-
ing for improvements and reform. Law might now also be shown
to be ‘unacceptable’ and ‘wrong’ in a more fundamental way, and
the criteria that are used to evaluate law can in such an approach
be generated from outside the ﬁeld of law itself, be they political,
ethical, moral, and so forth.
But whatever the fruits of such a move, a certain question
remains intact, and important: what does it actually mean, in the
ﬁrst place, to claim that law is a normative discipline? What are the
wider implications of such a claim? Can the answer be so simple
that one need merely refer to law’s normative object of study and
the conclusions that the legal participant must allegedly draw from
this? Why is law a ‘‘normative discipline’’?
In order to illuminate these questions and their relevance to the
discipline of law, I wish to begin with a well-known standpoint that
is often regarded as both external to that discipline, and extreme in
its implications: what we might call Michel Foucault’s ‘antilegal-
ism’. In developing his genealogical project in the ﬁrst part of the
History of Sexuality, Foucault depicts his position in the following
enigmatic way:
One remains attached to a certain image of power-law, of power-sovereignty,
which was traced out by the theoreticians of right and the monarchic institution.
It is this image we must break free of, that is, of the theoretical privilege of law
and sovereignty, if we wish to analyse power within the concrete and historical
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framework of its operations. We must construct an analytics of power that no
longer takes law as a model and a code.1
In legal scholarship, Foucault’s outspoken reservations regarding
law have all too often been understood as a critique of law as a
social institution. Foucault’s commentaries would, then, be inter-
preted as a critical assessment of the prison system, of forensic psy-
chiatry, of criminology  in short, as a political criticism of the
legal instruments of power. Without wanting to deny the social or
political merits of such an approach, I would like to suggest the
possibility of an alternative interpretation. If we situate this ‘antile-
gal’ position within the context of Foucault’s other work from the
same period, law would rather have something to do with the way
in which knowledge is produced.2 So when Foucault talks about a
‘theoretical privilege’ and about law as ‘model and code’, he is, if I
am right, referring to the normative matrices that regulate the
production of knowledge in modern societies.3
The aim of this article is to demonstrate how law, understood as
a normative discipline, also regulates the production of legal
knowledge. I wish to argue that the normative character of law is
displayed on two different levels: ﬁrstly, that of the legal norms
themselves, as the objects studied; and, secondly, the various con-
ceptual, epistemological and methodological rules that regulate the
way in which the discipline is carried out. I would like to contest
the conventional understanding that it is the normative object that
binds the discipline of law to the rather restricted perspective of the
participant and argue that, on the contrary, it is the disciplinary
framework of law understood as a science that introduces these
restrictions as norms. And further, the two levels of normative
1 M. Foucault, La volonte´ de savoir. Histoire de la sexualite´ 1 (Paris: Gallimard,
1976), pp. 1189. In English, M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An
Introduction (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1980), p. 90.
2 Foucault’s chair at the Colle`ge de France that he inherited from the Hegelian
philosopher Jean Hyppolite in 1970 was renamed from ‘the history of philosophical
thinking’ to ‘the history of systems of thought’. On the appointment, see e.g. D.
Eribon, Michel Foucault [so.], trans. B. Wing (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), pp.
21223.
3 On the critique of ‘sociological’ interpretations of Foucault, see e.g. V. Tadros,
‘Between Governance and Discipline: The Law and Michel Foucault’, Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 18/1 (1998), 75103 and V. Voruz, ‘The Politics of the
Culture of Control: Undoing Genealogy’, Economy and Society 34/1 (2005), 15472.
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object and disciplinary rules seem to be curiously bound together in
a particular understanding of positive law.
LAW AND ‘NORMOLOGY’
In order to illustrate the way in which the discipline of law regu-
lates the production of legal knowledge, I wish to turn to an exam-
ple from the heart of the legal tradition, namely Hans Kelsen’s
pure theory of law.4 An important, albeit often neglected, contribu-
tion to Kelsen’s theory is his relatively unknown treatise on law
and sovereignty  originally published in 1920 but, unfortunately,
never translated into English.5 The book is divided into two parts.
The second part articulates perhaps for the ﬁrst time Kelsen’s well-
known ‘‘paciﬁstic’’ solution to the antinomy of multiple national
jurisdictions: although there are no theoretical grounds for the pri-
macy of international law over sovereign national legal systems, it
is a practical necessity if war is to be avoided.6 But much less has
been written about the book’s ﬁrst part. Here Kelsen attempts to
formulate a theory of sovereignty as, following the book’s general
subtitle, a ‘‘contribution to a pure theory of law’’. During his ‘clas-
sical period’, extending roughly from the turn of the century to the
publication of the ﬁrst edition of The Pure Theory of Law in 1934,7
Kelsen’s project was to redeﬁne the requirements of a normative
discipline from a variety of angles involving the relationship
4 An excellent analysis of Kelsen’s pure theory of law, also sensitive to the the-
oretical concerns of this article, can be found in I. Stewart, ‘The Critical Legal
Science of Hans Kelsen’, Journal of Law and Society 17/3 (1990), 273308. See also
S. Papaefthymiou, ‘The House that Kelsen Built: On Some ‘‘Antinomies’’ in Kelsen’s
Thought’, Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft Nr. 98 (2004), 10110.
5 H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souvera¨nita¨t und die Theorie des Vo¨lkerrechts.
Beitrag zu einer reinen Rechtslehre. 2. Neudruck der 2. Auﬂage, Tu¨bingen 1928
(Aalen: Scientia, 1981). See however H. Kelsen, ‘Sovereignty and International Law’,
The Georgetown Law Journal 48/2 (1960), 62740.
6 As later stated in e.g. H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State. Translated
by Anders Wedberg (New York, NY: (Russell & Russell) 1961), p. 388.
7 H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaftliche Prob-
lematik. 1. Auﬂage (Aalen: Scientia, 1994). Published in English as H. Kelsen,
Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory. Translated by Bonnie Litschewski
Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson. With an introduction by Stanley L. Paulson
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
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between state and law.8 I will try to recapitulate the theoretical
arguments of the ﬁrst part of Kelsen’s book with the help of seven
propositions on sovereignty that should, at least as far as Kelsen is
concerned, follow one another logically. With these propositions I
hope to be able to show the rather complex way in which the pure
theory of law constitutes a normative discipline. I hope also, in the
process, to clarify a few widely held misconceptions about Kelsen’s
particular brand of legal positivism.
Firstly, like most of the German tradition in law in general, for
Kelsen sovereignty is always state sovereignty. Sovereignty is an
essential attribute of the state, and it should be studied as such.
And because Kelsen holds that the state can be normatively exam-
ined only in relation to its legal structure, a theory of state sover-
eignty must consequently also be a legal theory.9 Kelsen is here
making an intentional distinction between a factual and a norma-
tive discipline, i.e. between what he understands as a sociological
approach to the state  as represented in the work of e.g. Max
Weber and Georg Jellinek  and a purely normative approach that
one might call ‘‘law proper’’.10 Of course, Kelsen’s choice of this
distinction might be criticised  there are other choosable perspec-
tives on offer. But if we grant the plausibility, at least, of this initial
step, and take in earnest Kelsen’s attempts at deﬁning the parame-
ters of law as a speciﬁcally normative discipline, the claims that fol-
low seem to adhere to a remarkably consistent accuracy and logic.
Secondly, because the theory of state sovereignty is a legal and
normative theory, the state itself cannot be understood as a factual
entity, i.e. as a set of empirical regularities that apply to the ‘real
world’. Instead the state must be conceived as a personiﬁcation of
8 On the early Kelsen in general, see C. Jabloner, ‘Kelsen and His Circle: The
Viennese Years’, European Journal of International Law 9(2) (1998), 36887. Even
though these early years make up theoretically the most consistent elaborations of
the pure theory of law, central texts (e.g. the Hauptprobleme and the Allgemeine
Staatslehre) remain unavailable in English. On the problems of ‘periodising’ Kelsen’s
work, see S.L. Paulson, ‘Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory  Reﬂections
on a Periodization’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18(1) (1998), 15366.
9 Kelsen, Das Problem der Souvera¨nita¨t, pp. 112.
10 Cf. H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff. Kritische
Untersuchung des Verha¨ltnisses von Staat und Recht. 2. photomechanisch gedruckte
Auﬂ. (Tu¨bingen: Mohr, 1928) and H. Kelsen, U¨ber Grenzen zwischen juristischer und
soziologischer Methode. Neudr. d. Ausg. Tu¨bingen 1911 (Aalen: Scientia, 1970). See
also Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, pp. 16278.
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its legal structure, i.e. as a legal person. In other words, if the state
is understood as an expression of its legal structure, then state sov-
ereignty must by necessity also be the sovereignty of law. A legal
theory of state sovereignty is, then, a theory of the sovereignty of
law.11 With his second claim, then, Kelsen is insisting that a legal
or a normative theory of state sovereignty is ultimately equivalent
to a theory of the sovereignty of the state’s legal structure, i.e. of
law. A state is normatively speaking sovereign only to the extent
that the law that it personiﬁes is sovereign.12
Thirdly, a legal theory of sovereignty must be, using Kelsen’s
own neologism, ‘normological’ (normlogisch). This normological
requirement encompasses two claims. On the one hand, the object
of any legal theory must be normative. Law belongs to the norma-
tive world of the ‘ought’, where all possible objects of scientiﬁc
study must be normative entities such as laws, norms and rules. On
the other hand, these normative entities must also be in a logical
relationship to one another. Like all other advocates of such a nor-
mative approach, Kelsen claims that one cannot infer a norm from
factual circumstances: an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. A norm is a norm
only if it is valid, and the validity of any given norm can only be
inferred from the validity of a higher norm. If this were not the
case, we could not talk about legal knowledge as Kelsen under-
stands it.13 A normative theory of state sovereignty is, then, a the-
ory about legal norms and their logical interrelations.14
Fourthly, then, the logical system of legal norms that a norma-
tive theory constructs is a layered hierarchical structure including
norms of varying normative force: there are higher norms and lower
norms, and the validity of the latter is always inferred from the for-
mer. But because the validity of even the highest norm must logi-
cally be inferred from something higher, we must hypothesise
something that Kelsen at this point still calls the original norm, i.e.
a logical precondition for the layered pyramid-like structure of high-
er and lower norms that will later develop into the infamous ‘‘tran-
scendental-logical’’ basic norm of the pure theory of law.15 The
11 Kelsen, Das Problem der Souvera¨nita¨t, pp. 227.
12 See also Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, pp. 1889.
13 Kelsen, Das Problem der Souvera¨nita¨t, pp. 89.
14 See also H. Kelsen, ‘On the Basis of Legal Validity’, American Journal of
Jurisisprudence 26 (1981), 17889.
15 Kelsen, Das Problem der Souvera¨nita¨t, pp. 923.
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logical system that these norms form is called the legal order which
is, then, the outcome of legal knowledge rather than its object.16
Fifthly, the sovereignty of law which, in Kelsen’s terms, is the
same thing as the sovereignty of the legal order is depicted with the
help of three attributes. A sovereign legal order is ‘highest’ because
no other normative order can be superimposed above it. From
Kelsen’s point of view, this would primarily refer to theories of
natural law that subject the legal order to one ethical order or an-
other. The legal order is also ‘uniﬁed’ because, as the outcome of
legal knowledge, it must be logically constructed into a single en-
tity. This is an indication of the Kantian epistemological ‘architec-
tonics’ behind Kelsen’s theoretical reasoning. Lastly, the
‘uniqueness’ of the legal order implies that it is distinct from all
other normative orders, from ethical orders and other such extra-
legal systems as well as from other legal orders.17
As his sixth argument, Kelsen insists that if we acknowledge the
foregoing ﬁve claims about law and sovereignty, then the sover-
eignty of the legal order is only another way of articulating its pos-
itivity. To speak of the legal order as ‘highest’, ‘uniﬁed’ and
‘unique’ is to claim that it is ‘positive’ as Kelsen understands the
term.18 Positive law is, then, neither factual nor empirical law in
16 About the basic norm as a ‘‘transcendental-logical’’ requirement, see Kelsen,
Reine Rechtslehre, pp. 667. In English, Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of
Legal Theory, p. 58. See also H. Kelsen, ‘On the Basic Norm’, California Law Review
47 (1 March) (1959), 10710. The ﬁctive nature of the basic norm has caused much
confusion in Anglo-American readings of Kelsen. See e.g. J. Raz, The Concept of a
Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System, 2nd edn. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 646 and J. Raz, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm’,
American Journal of Jurisprudence 19 (1974), 94111. Cf. A. Wilson, ‘Joseph Raz on
Kelsen’s Basic Norm’, American Journal of Jurisprudence 27 (1982), 4663. On the
philosophy of theoretical ﬁctions in general, see H. Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des Als
Ob. System der theoretischen, praktischen und religio¨sen Fiktionen der Menschheit auf
Grund einer idealistischen Positivismus (Aalen: Scientia, 1986). In English, OH.
Vaihinger, The Philosophy of ‘As If’: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and
Religious Fictions of Mankind. Translated by C.K. Ogden (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1934). On the development of Kelsen’s take on ﬁctions, see P. Min-
kkinen, Thinking Without Desire. A First Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Hart, 1999), p.
38. On Kelsen and the Anglo-American analytical tradition of jurisprudence, see H.
Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence’, Harvard Law
Review 55/1 (1941), 4470.
17 H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1925), p. 109. See
also Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, pp. 3836.
18 Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, p. 105.
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the sense that most followers and critics of the pure theory of law
would understand those terms. As positive law, the legal order is
made of legal norms, i.e. of theoretical propositions that are
inferred from legislation. Legal norms are, then, not the source of a
positivistic approach to law but already the outcome of a theoreti-
cal operation that has transformed existing factual law into the
objects of a normative discipline.19
And as his ﬁnal and seventh argument Kelsen claims that if the
sovereignty of law is only a synonym for its positivity, then the
sovereignty of the legal order is also merely another way of
expressing the purity of legal knowledge. A ‘highest’, ‘uniﬁed’ and
‘unique’ legal order is also the only possible object of a scientiﬁc
perspective to law which, according to Kelsen, can only be a ‘pure’
normative discipline.20
So in other words, Kelsen’s initial agenda has less to do with
ontological or phenomenological issues relating to legal norms
(‘What is law?’) than with the epistemological preconditions of law
as a normative discipline and a science (‘How can we know about
law?’). In fact, one could even argue that, with reference to his
Kantian and neo-Kantian sources of inspiration, Kelsen is attempt-
ing to conceptualise legal norms in a way that would make a scien-
tiﬁc theory of law possible.21 And by doing so, Kelsen turns the
familiar claim concerning the participant’s perspective on its head.
That is to say, it is not the speciﬁc characteristics of legal norms
that would give the discipline of law its particular perspective, whe-
ther the participant’s perspective or another, but rather vice versa:
a particular perspective, namely a scientiﬁc perspective, requires
that legal norms are deﬁned and conceptualised in a particular
way.
This would mean that Kelsen’s ‘normological’ account of law
and sovereignty includes within itself two normative orders instead
of merely one. The pure theory of law is, then, plagued by a sort of
19 On the difference between Kelsen’s understanding of positive law and what
one could call ‘vulgar’ positivism, see Kelsen, Das Problem der Souvera¨nita¨t, pp.
878, footnote 1 and K. Bergbohm, Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie: Kritische
Abhandlungen. Erster Band (Glashu¨tten im Taunus: Detlev Auvermann, 1973), pp.
523, footnote.
20 Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, pp. 1056.
21 On Kelsen’s neo-Kantian afﬁnities in general, see S.L. Paulson, ‘The
Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 12/3 (1992), 31132.
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double-normativity. The ﬁrst order represents the normative object
of the pure theory of law, namely legal norms, whereas the second
order consists of the implied norms that regulate the way in which
knowledge of legal norms must be produced  a ‘logic’ of sorts
that lies behind legal thinking itself. If legal norms proper are to be
found in the ﬁrst order, then the latter would include such basic
principles of a legal science as the division of the factual and the
normative (the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’), the particular relationships be-
tween normative propositions, the postulated basic norm, and so
on.
But how should we understand this second ‘logical’ order? How
does it relate to law being a normative discipline?
NORMATIVE LOGIC
Kelsen’s pure theory of law is, of course, much richer and more
complex than a rather hasty reading of a single text can suggest.
But for the sake of argument, let us condense his second normative
order  that is, all the different conceptual, epistemological and
methodological claims that Kelsen makes about law as a normative
discipline  into a single normative proposition: ‘law ought to be a
pure theory of norms’. Using this condensed proposition as an
example, I will next try to illustrate how Kelsen’s normative ‘logic’
operates and why it falls short of a genuine theoretical approach to
law.
Logic is normative to the extent that its laws are prescriptive.
According to Gottlob Frege, the word ‘law’ is used in two distinct
ways. Moral and state laws refer to prescriptions that ‘ought’ to be
followed but with which actual occurrences do not always conform:
one ‘ought’ to abide by the law, but this, of course, does not
always happen. The laws of nature, on the other hand, are not pre-
scriptive as such. They refer to natural occurrences that are always
in accordance with these laws. There is, for example, nothing pre-
scriptive as such in a law of nature that depicts the way in which a
given cause by necessity leads to a certain effect. Frege understands
the laws of logic mainly in this latter sense. But even if the laws of
logic are not directly prescriptive in their content, the normativity
of logic follows indirectly from the truth-seeking task of all science:
‘From the laws of truth there follow prescriptions for asserting,
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thinking, judging, inferring. And so we also speak of the laws of
thinking’.22 It is, then, truth itself  or in Kelsen’s case more pre-
cisely ‘scientiﬁc knowledge’  that obliges.
The phenomenologist philosopher Edmund Husserl claims that
scientiﬁc logic is normative because its aim is to assess to what
extent a given discipline  law or otherwise  measures up to its
own idea. Logic, then, both evaluates a discipline in relation to its
ideal form and conducts it into that direction.23 In, for example,
Kelsen’s case, the condensed proposition that ‘law ought to be a
pure theory of norms’ presupposes that one approach to law may
be ‘purer’ than another, and that there may even be approaches
that do not live up to even the minimum requirements of a ‘pure
theory’. In addition, the measuring of different approaches to law
implies that, to stick with our example, a ‘purer’ approach is in
some way ‘better’ than an approach that is ‘less pure’: it is, per-
haps, ‘more accurate’, ‘more acceptable’, ‘more scientiﬁc’, and so
on. All in all, these evaluations and judgements are normative in so
far as they all suggest what the discipline of law ‘ought’ to be.24
For Husserl, these evaluations and judgements form together a
normative hierarchy of sorts very much like Kelsen’s pyramid of
legal norms where the validity of a lower norm is inferred from a
higher one. For example, evaluating the purity of a particular
approach to law is always done in a comparative mode, in relation
to an approach that is ‘purer’ than the approach being evaluated.
22 G. Frege, ‘Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung’, Beitra¨ge zur Philoso-
phie des deutschen Idealismus I (19181919), 5877, p. 58. In English, G. Frege,
‘Thoughts’, pp. 35172, in Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy.
Translated by Max Black et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), p. 351. Frege’s ‘norma-
tive’ notion of logic is essentially Kantian: ‘Logic is not only a formal but also a
material science of reason, an a priori science of the necessary laws of thinking [...] a
science of the correct use of understanding and reason, not, however, in a subjective
sense, i.e. the empirical (psychological) principles according to which understanding
thinks, but objective, i.e. the a priori principles according to which it ought to think’.
I. Kant, Logik, pp. 1-150, in Gesammelte Schriften. Erste Abtheilung: Werke. Band
IX. Herausgegeben von der Ko¨niglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
(Berlin/Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1923), p. 16.
23 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band. Prolegomena zur reinen
Logik. 6. Auﬂage (Tu¨bingen: Max Niemeyer, 1980), pp. 268. In English, E. Hus-
serl, Logical Investigations. Volume 1. Prolegomena to Pure Logic. Translated by
J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 702.
24 Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, pp. 405. In English, Husserl, Logical
Investigations, pp. 815.
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And just like Kelsen, Husserl also claims that in order to remain
consistent  ‘logical’, if you will  we must presuppose a basic
norm, a hypothetical and even ﬁctive highest norm at the top of
the hierarchy. This norm will be the origin and the source of all
normative validity within the structure. The basic norm is, then,
not an ‘existing’ norm but, once again, a presupposition required in
any normative discipline.25
But this is where the similarities end. For unlike Kelsen, Husserl
designates his basic norm two distinct functions. Firstly, the basic
norm has what Husserl understands as a ‘regulative’ function. In
the case of logic, the basic norm establishes the validity with which
the various normative evaluations and judgements within the hierar-
chy can perform their measuring function and direct a given
approach towards the ideal form of the discipline. By doing so, the
basic norm produces unity and cohesion within the discipline, and
as such, it contributes to the development of a disciplinary tradition.
But secondly and more importantly, the basic norm also includes
within itself something that Husserl calls a ‘constitutive content’:
The basic norm (or basic value, or ultimate end) determines, we saw, the unity of
the discipline: it also is what imports the thought of normativity into all its norma-
tive propositions. But alongside of this general thought of measurement in terms of
a basic norm, these propositions have their own theoretical content, which differs
from one case to another. Each expresses the thought of a measuring relation be-
tween norm and what it is a norm for [...] Every normative proposition of, e.g., the
form ‘An A should be B’ implies the theoretical proposition ‘Only an A which is B
has the properties C’, in which ‘C’ serves to indicate the constitutive content of the
standard-setting predicate ‘good’ (e.g. pleasure, knowledge, whatever, in short, is
marked down as good by the valuation fundamental to our given sphere).26
So if we claim that, to stick once again with the example I have
chosen, ‘law ought to be a pure theory of norms’ because it is
‘good’, ‘scientiﬁc’ or whatever, we are simultaneously implying that
such an approach, namely a ‘pure theory of norms’, has something
unique about it. It must by necessity somehow include within itself
the ‘properties C’ and, as such, stand out from all other
approaches.27 And Husserl’s important point here is that this
25 Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, pp. 456. In English, Husserl, Logical
Investigations, pp. 856.
26 Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, p. 48; Logical Investigations, pp. 878.
27 Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, p. 27; Logical Investigations, p. 71.
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uniqueness, whatever it may substantially be, cannot be norma-
tively determined through the regulative function of the basic
norm, through rules and propositions that tell us what we ‘ought’
to do if we wish our approach to be recognised as, for example, a
‘pure theory of norms’. In order to say something signiﬁcant about
its normative object, all normative disciplines  be it law, logic or
their ‘normological’ fusion  require a theoretical elaboration of
their own ‘uniqueness’, their ‘idea’:
If a normative science is to deserve its name, if it wants to do scientific work on
the relations of the facts to be normatively considered and their basic norms, it
must study the content of the theoretical nucleus of these relations, and this means
entering the spheres of the relevant theoretical sciences. In other words: Every nor-
mative discipline demands that we know certain non-normative truths [...]28
I argued earlier that Kelsen’s ‘normology’ implied the existence
of two normative orders, namely the legal norms themselves and
the normative requirements regulating legal knowledge. But he does
not seem to be explicitly conscious of the second normative order
and how it affects the ﬁrst. Instead Kelsen seems to merge the two
orders together in his concept of sovereignty. With two distinct
normative orders we should, in fact, be talking about two original
or basic norms with two distinct constitutive contents: namely the
idea of normativity and the idea of conceptual purity. And follow-
ing Husserl’s lead we should, perhaps, be studying both in a truly
theoretical way.
But Kelsen seems to restrict his observations to the ways in
which the second ‘logical’ order normatively regulates the ﬁrst
order of ‘norms’ through sovereignty. And as such, Kelsen’s pure
theory of law can never be a theoretical enterprise but only a nor-
mative discipline in the same mode as Husserl’s notion of logic.
For Kelsen, sovereignty operates mainly as the epistemological
guarantee of the purity of legal knowledge. He never elaborates
‘purity’ in any theoretical way; ‘purity’ is but a normative demand
that the discipline of law must comply with by following the indi-
vidual dictates that the pure theory of law determines. But because
purity itself is never addressed as a scientiﬁc concept, one must
somehow try to avoid the overwhelming questions that would
otherwise follow. In both the issues of legal norms and of purity,
28 Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, p. 49; Logical Investigations, p. 88.
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Kelsen’s sovereignty closes access to the constitutive contents of the
basic norms that would permit the theoretical elaboration of the
most fundamental questions: ‘What is a legal norm?’ ‘What is pure
knowledge?’
Although the afﬁnities between the two contemporaries have
been recognised often enough, much less has been said about the
differences in the ways in which Kelsen and Husserl understand the
notion of a normative discipline and the role of the basic norm in
it.29 But whatever the epistemological merits of the ‘transcendental-
logical’ ﬁction may be in Kelsen’s science, Husserl’s phenomenolog-
ical understanding of the basic norm seems to indicate a fundamen-
tal dilemma: the pure theory of law is not and cannot be a
theoretical discipline to begin with, but merely a technology
(Kunstlehre).30
LAW AND KNOWLEDGE
So when Foucault talks about the ‘theoretical privilege of law and
sovereignty’ or law as ‘model and code’, he is, to my mind, refer-
ring mainly to the second ‘logical’ order and how it regulates the
production of knowledge in various disciplines. It is a reference to
the epistemological rules and requirements that are expressed as
norms and are consequently responsible for the normative regula-
tion of a given discipline. And Foucault seems to be implying that
it is speciﬁcally ‘law’ that plays a special role in the way in which
knowledge and truth are produced as, e.g., one of the ‘‘general
rules’’ guiding the investigations of Discipline and Punish indicates:
29 Kelsen is not unaware of Husserl’s work. He speciﬁcally mentions the ‘general
distinction between ‘‘logism’’ and ‘‘psychologism’’ that has been presented in a
classical way in Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen’. H. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der
Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze. 2. Neudruck der zweiten,
um eine Vorrede vermehrten Auﬂage, Tu¨bingen 1923 (Aalen: Scientia, 1984), p. ix.
In his posthumously published ‘general theory’, Kelsen attempts to address Husserl’s
point on normative disciplines and the basic norm but, in my mind, misses the mark
not seeming to understand the theoretical idea of the constitutive content of the basic
norm. H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen. Im Auftrag des Hans-Kelsen-
Instituts aus dem Nachlaß herausgegeben von Kurt Ringhofer und Robert Walter
(Wien: Manz, 1979), pp. 15860. A classic study on Kelsen and Husserl is F. Ka-
ufmann, Logik und Rechtswissenschaft. Grundriß eine Systems der reinen Rechtslehre
(Tu¨bingen: Mohr, 1922).
30 Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, p. 47. In English, Husserl, Logical
Investigations, pp. 867.
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Instead of treating the history of penal law and the history of the human sciences as
two separate series [... we should] see whether there is not some common matrix or
whether they do not both derive from a single process of ‘epistemologico-juridical’
formation31
The ‘antilegal’ position that I referred to earlier would in this
case be directed less towards law understood as a social institution,
as towards a normative matrix that is responsible for the regulation
of knowledge and the control of scientiﬁc discourses. It is not too
difﬁcult to conceive of law as a process in which a particular type
of knowledge is produced, but then we would be referring to the
structural characteristics of the process. One of Foucault’s lesser-
known texts even attempts to construct a comprehensive history of
normative knowledge-production through such procedural matrices
of law.32
My attempt has been to clarify the way in which such processes
operate in legal knowledge through its double-normativity. Law is a
normative discipline in two distinct ways. Firstly: in the sense that
its object of study is legal norms  though the restricted perspective
of the participant is not determined or regulated by that object of
study, but through a normative epistemology. The doctrinal law-
yer’s attempts to monopolise the study of law into a normative dis-
cipline cannot, then, be grounded in the object studied, i.e. in legal
norms. Her socio-legal counterpart studies the same object but, just
like Kelsen in his ﬁrst proposition on sovereignty, has decisively
chosen a particular approach to guide her investigations. Both ad-
here to normative epistemologies in the sense that even a socio-legal
approach is built on a participatory model determining an ‘inside’
and an ‘outside’: the socio-legal participant must also recognise the
rules of her particular game. The argument, then, is not about an
object of study and what it implies but about normative claims to
truth. And because these claims are normative, they can always be
contested. For Foucault, the normativity of such claims to truth is
31 M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard,
1975), p. 28. In English, .M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison.
Translated by Alan Sheridan (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 23.
32 M. Foucault, ‘La ve´rite´ et les formes juridiques’, pp. 1406514, in Dits et e´crits
I, 19541975 (Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001). In English, M. Foucault, ‘Truth and
Juridical Forms’, pp. 189, in ed. J.D. Faubion, Power. Essential Works of Foucault
19541984. Volume 3 (London: Penguin, 2002). See also P. Minkkinen, ‘The
Juridical Matrix’, Social & Legal Studies 6/3 (1997), 42543.
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apparent in the way in which Kantian critique marks the threshold
to modernity by deﬁning the ‘‘legal limits’’ of knowledge,33 in the
way in which the legal logic of family is the ‘‘hinge’’ that makes
disciplinary systems possible to begin with,34 in the way in which a
particular governmental technology is ‘‘juridically indexed’’ to the
economy in governmentality,35 and so on.
I don’t believe that Foucault would have retreated to any ‘theo-
retical’ vision, phenomenological or other, in order to explain the
power structures of modern society. In contrast to the ‘‘totalitar-
ian’’ theories that operate with law as their model and code,
Foucault’s genealogical project was an attempt to liberate deviant
discourses from any such theoretical control.36 But even if the
power struggles were deﬁned simply through the existence of con-
ﬂicting discourses, Foucault’s analytics of power was never merely
descriptive. Because it was always more or less easy to predict
which deviant discourses were worthy of the genealogist’s analytical
consideration, we may, perhaps, also be in a position to assume
that, despite numerous self-professed claims to the contrary, Fou-
cault’s vocabulary of liberation somehow betrays a meta-ethics of
sorts that, at the end of the day, directs the course of the analysis.
This would make even Foucault’s analytics of power a normative
discipline, but this time in a very different way.
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33 M. Foucault, Les mots et les choses. Une arche´ologie des sciences humaines
(Paris: Gallimard, 1966), p. 255. In English, M. Foucault, The Order of Things. An
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Tavistock, 1970), p. 242.
34 M. Foucault, Le pouvoir psychiatrique. Cours au Colle`ge de France
(19731974) (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 2003), p. 82.
35 M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Colle`ge de France
(19781979) (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 2004), pp. 299300.
36 M. Foucault, ‘Il faut de´fendre la socie´te´’. Cours au Colle`ge de France
(19751976) (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 1997), pp. 710. In English, M. Foucault,
‘Society Must BeDefended’: Lectures at the College de France, 19751976. Trans-
lated by David Macey (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. 610.
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